We utilize data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to study borrowing decisions and other factors related to the run-up in housing prices in 1999-2007, their precipitous decline in 2007-2009, and how they contributed to mortgage distress and foreclosures as of 2009-2011. Difficulties were concentrated in selected real estate markets where the Case Shiller home index declined more than 35% from 2007 to 2009. Often expecting further price appreciation or responding to a positive family labor market and income circumstance, homeowners, supported by their lenders, allocated too much of their family income to support house payments and put themselves in a risky position. The year of taking the original mortgage, the rate of decrease in the Case-Shiller home price index, household wealth, and labor market and disability status are substantial predictors of mortgage payment distress and foreclosure.
Introduction and Literature
In this paper, we study the factors related to family level mortgage distress and foreclosure in the U. S. economy, 2007-2011. Rapid appreciation in home prices has been observed in many advanced economies. In Japan the housing markets for condominiums experienced a sharp rise in prices, 1987-1991, with Tokyo prices leading the way up quickly followed by Osaka prices. Then Tokyo prices led the way, precipitously downward, followed closely by those in Osaka, 1992 Osaka, -1995 . The path of the rising prices and then sharply declining prices in Osaka and Tokyo, 1987-1995 , has essentially the same shape as the Case-Shiller average of 10 major urban markets in the U. S., 1999-2009 . A housing price boom occurred in Scandinavia: in Sweden, housing prices tripled after the mid 1990s, with similar patterns observed in other Northern European countries. In Sweden, a boom developed during 1985 -1990 . Subsequently, a bust occurred, 1990 -1993 , with a severe impact on the wider Swedish economy (Jaffé, 1994) . 1 Various factors explaining the presence of a housing bubble include the difficulty of holding a short position in a heterogeneous commodity. Another strand in the literature is that of unfounded optimism in the value of a particular class of investment, including railroads or real estate. This was the premise behind the concepts set out by Irving Fisher (1933) in his effort to understand the Great Depression, and has a modern form in the notion of Keynes' 'animal spirits' or expectation contagion (Akerloff and Shiller, 2009) 2 In Fisher's assessment: 1 There was a shift to more favorable tax deductions of mortgage interest, and a dramatic increase in the financing and construction of multi-unit housing ensued. The cycle in commercial real estate was even more acute. 2 Work in neuroscience establishes the presence of a mirror neuron center in the brain which gives rise to human propensities to behave in a pattern 'mirroring' that of others (Iacoboni, 2009). 1 "The public psychology of going into debt for gain passes through several more or less distinct phases: (a) the lure of big prospective dividends or gains in income in the remote future; (b) the hope of selling at a profit, and realizing a capital gain in the immediate future; (c) the vogue of reckless promotions, taking advantage of the habituation of the public to great expectations; (d) the development of downright fraud, imposing on a public which had grown credulous and gullible."
In particular, the resulting downturn in housing prices and associated delinquencies on mortgages are generally considered to be the major cause of the crisis in credit markets that subsequently spilled into the other sectors of the U.S. economy in the form of a Fisherian debtdeflation. In our study, the most substantial predictor of mortgage distress and foreclosure is the family's allocation of a high share of family income going to housing payments for interest, taxes, and utilities. Higher values of housing payments to family income --HPI were more common in markets with strong appreciation during the housing boom.
Owner-occupied housing is the major asset in many households' portfolios and across a wide span of the life cycle (Hurst, Luoh, and Stafford, 1998; Wolff, 2010) . Housing wealth is an important determinant of consumption and saving behavior of households and is often correlated with savings and better overall financial management. For example, Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) find that housing wealth has substantial effects on household consumption and the U. S. economy. Dvornak and Kohler (2003) , analyzing the data of a panel of Australian states, show that a one dollar permanent increase in housing wealth can cause a three cent increase in long-run annual consumption. As shown by Jaffe (2004), disruptions in the housing market can have widespread and long lasting effects via the connection to other spending and economic activity.
Housing services are the consumption dimension, but on the financial side, recent research (Hurst and Stafford, 2004; Cooper, 2009 ) supports home ownership as playing a central collateral or liquidity role (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) -in contrast to the wealth effects found for non-pension holdings of stocks (Juster, Lupton, Smith and Stafford, 2006) and the 'wealth' interpretation offered 2 by Bostic, Gabriel and Painter. In the Hurst-Stafford framework there are two motivations for exercising the option to refinance a mortgage. There is a traditional 'financial option' allowing the homeowner to realize a net worth gain and possibly an asset reallocation when an existing mortgage can be refinanced at a lower interest rate. A second motivation for exercising the refinancing option is to tap into equity and 'borrow up' to support consumption.
Exercising this 'consumption option' can lead to refinancing to both a higher loan balance and a higher rate of interest. This perspective has been given added support in the analysis of aggregate data (Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008) . A substantial share of equity withdrawals was found to support personal consumption expenditures. Since the different balance sheet components are fungible, this consumption allocation is consistent with equity withdrawal as a supplement to cash flow to spend beyond current cash flow from income sources.
Connected to the 'consumption option' is a third motivation to refinance: borrowing to cover cash flow requirements from home ownership that are induced by interest, tax and utility costs. This refinancing can otherwise be thought of as a '"speculation-based liquidity option'. That is, refinancing for a position in housing which embodies a wider set of and higher level of costs.
These are costs beyond those related to normal predicted consumption, based on income and family composition. Rather the funds support speculative financing, based on expected appreciation. This appears to have played a major role in the housing market turbulence, [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Tapping into perceived equity gains from rising home prices can clearly be risky as changes in the family balance sheet are mixing with expense flows. In short, during the boom, families and their lenders more often took on a jointly speculative position, leading to increased cash flow demands to cover 3 housing costs -and reducing liquidity other than from future borrowing on equity gains. In effect, the borrowing collateral was often based on expected future appreciation.
3
The decisions to invest in housing and hold a substantial mortgage are usually associated with younger households (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) , as part of a life-cycle approach to consumption and asset management (Campbell and Viciera, 2002; Deaton, 2001) . But the housing boom of 1999-2005 induced many of those, even 60 years or older, to depart from the prior norm and to hold more housing and have greater mortgage debt than earlier cohorts. In 1986, 20.4 percent of owners age 65-79 held a mortgage on their home. By 2005, this had increased to 35.8 percent. A study by Apgar and Di (2006) reports that mortgage debt owed by older households nearly quadrupled between 1989 and 2001. In 2001, after accounting for inflation, the typical household headed by someone 65 or older had $44,000 in mortgage debt, compared with $12,000 in 1989 (Apgar and Di, 2006) .
Even at the lower mortgage rates, by 2007 mortgage debt payments as well as other expenses for insurance and taxes had become a rising share of family income compared to earlier periods.
This was most pronounced in specific urban markets. With rising home expenses and a greater cost of home debt servicing, even elderly homeowners, many of whom live on fixed or limited incomes, found themselves in a financially constrained, or even distressed, liquidity situation should there be a reversal in home prices. As can be seen in Possibly these early foreclosure sales were enough to precipitate the downward price path for housing in numerous markets. Crouhy, Jarrow, and Turnbull (2008) argue that banks implemented some risky actions before the real estate bubble burst. Demyanyk and Hemert (2009) show that the quality of loans decreased greatly during the dramatic expansion of the subprime (securitized) mortgage market. On the other side of the mortgage market, households also may take risky positions before the burst of the real estate bubble. Campbell (2003) shows that people with low risk aversion would be more likely to take Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM). Some other papers (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009; Coulibaly and Li, 2009; and Immerqluck, 2009 ) also discuss the risky position of lenders and borrowers in the mortgage market.
Here we explore some of the themes outlined above by using the data in the longstanding, 
Net Worth, Emerging Patterns of Assets and Home Mortgage
We review selected basic patterns of household net worth for those headed by a person age 65 and older and of those at midlife, age 40-49, along with age profiles of participation on the home mortgage market over time. In Table 2 Holding a high mortgage-based DSR is one measure of a family's housing risk. The expectation of additional future increases in home prices and continued employment can be the motivation for enduring a higher current cash flow burden. Expanding this to include all other housing related payments relative to family income, housing payments to income (HPI) provides another measure of housing service cost burden.
Included in HPI are payments for interest on the first and second mortgage, and with rising house prices come rising real estate taxes, and along with utilities, the cash flow going into owner occupied housing was on the rise, 1990-2007. Retrospectively, we may want to conclude that these were evident patterns of 'excess' in the housing and mortgage market and related to the various mortgage quality measures reported from industry data. At the time of the upswing, observers could refer to stable and falling ex post loan-to-value ratios, but these were often driven by home price appreciation that did not persist, mostly in the markets with rapidly rising home prices. Edward
Gramlich (2007) There was a general rise in the share of income going to support homeowner expenses for all age groups. While stronger for younger families, there was also a rise for those age 50 and older.
In addition, many homeowners had refinanced in the near term, especially is selected states. Given Since foreclosure has relatively few cases (74 recently completed foreclosure cases, or 4% out of 1827 panel observations), and is quite distinct from pre-foreclosure distress, a separate estimation was implemented.
Outcomes and Discussion
The mortgage distress index (Index 1) for Table 3 Column 1 was constructed by summing up measure 1 through measure 5. It has 10 possible values and ranges from 0 to 4. We estimated the 10 Measure 4 is limited to those providing specific dollar answers to the questions on house value and outstanding mortgage balance(s). Measure 5 includes every mortgage holder even if they gave bracket answers and had missing information. For example they knew the monthly mortgage payment and interest rate and years to pay -but not the balance remaining and that was estimated from those elements given. Measures 4 and 5 have a correlation of .80 and are used as multiple indicators of being under water -each receiving a weight of .5. 11 There is always a baseline level of foreclosures and we want to separate those out from those induced by the contraction.
OLS regression of this and three other variants of the mortgage distress index on baseline regressors and those specifically for our housing, financial and labor market variables. The models include several family and demographic variables known to predict mortgage problems (Webb, Friedberg and Dushi, 2010) : age, race, marital status and education level of head, and the number of people in household at a given income level.
Of 
Analysis of Foreclosure 2009-2011
The process of foreclosure unfolds over time. In the Dodd-Frank bill the "ratios of total monthly debt to monthly income or alternate measures of ability" to pay should be considered when determining whether a mortgage is a "qualified mortgage" or not. 16 At a minimum, to develop market measures to assess the quality of existing mortgages, a measure of cash flow commitments to housing could be monitored along with the traditional index of loan to value (LTV). Given the heterogeneity across housing markets, the HPI ratio could be measured for individual urban housing markets such as those in the Case-Shiller index, using micro data such as the PSID, Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. *, ** and *** statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Included variables but not reported are: age categories, city size, region, and some labor market status measures such as student and retired which bore no relationship to the outcome. Available upon request. Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. *, ** and *** statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
